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Abstract
This paper develops a tractable dynamic microeconomic model of migration de-
cisions that is aggregated to describe the behavior of interregional migration. Our
structural approach allows to deal with dynamic self-selection problems that arises
from the endogeneity of location choice and the persistency of migration incentives.
Keeping track of the distribution dynamics of migration incentives has important
consequences, because these dynamics inﬂuences the estimation of structural pa-
rameters, such as migration costs. For US interstate migration, we obtain a cost
estimate of approximately two average annual household incomes. This is at most
half of the migration cost estimates reported in previous studies. We attribute this
diﬀerence to the treatment of the self selection problem.
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1 Introduction
Migration decisions are important economic decisions. Migration allows indivdual agents
to smooth income and is an important way of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992). Many factors inﬂuence the decision to migrate and there
is a vast empirical literature that links migration decisions to economic incentives (see
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1Greenwood, 1975, 1985, and 1997 and Cushing and Poot, 2004 for survey articles). At
the same time, most of this literature has remained relatively silent about the actual costs
of migration to individual agents. Nevertheless, migration costs are surely a structural
parameter of high interest (Sjaastad, 1962).
Recently, there has been a small number of studies that actually do report estimates
on migration costs. Davis, Greenwood, and Li (2001), henceforth DGL, report a cost
estimate of about US$ 180 000 for each migration between US states, and Kennan and
Walker (2005), henceforth KW, conclude that all other things equal migration costs
are at about US$ 270 000.1 In terms of average annual income, these migration costs
correspond to roughly 4-6 average annual household incomes. At any rate, such an
estimate appears very high and even the authors of these studies are somewhat sceptical
about their ﬁndings.
KW (2005) suggest that some kind of omitted variable problem may drive the high
cost estimate. In particular, they suggest that an unobservable wage component is
correlated to the decision to stay. We argue that the endogeneity of the location choice
will always lead to such correlation. In fact, this paper’s ﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h a ti ti sn e c e s s a r y
to keep track of the unobservable distribution of migration incentives over time to obtain
an unbiased estimate of migration costs.
This motivates us to develop a tractable microeconomic model of migration which can
be aggregated and used to describe the simultaneous evolution of migration incentives
and migration rates at an aggregate level. Our model picks up the general idea that
migration can be understood as an investment into human capital (Sjaastad, 1962) so
that the migration-decision problem is closely related to the decision problem for discrete
investment projects or lumpy investment.
For the lumpy investment setup, Caballero and Engel (1999) develop a methodolog-
ical framework that allows to estimate micro-level investment costs from aggregate data
only. We extend their work to migration decisions. This means that we ﬁrst develop
a structural model of the representative microeconomic problem of migration for het-
erogeneous households and in a second step, this model is used to derive the evolution
of the distribution of migration incentives. This evolution of incentives determines the
actual aggregate migration in turn.
We simulate this model and estimate migration costs via indirect inference (see
Gourieroux et al., 1993 and Smith, 1993). Particularly, we apply Smith’s (1993) simu-
lated quasi maximum likelihood method. We estimate migration costs to be about US$
1These estimates do not yet include markups for distance and other factors that inﬂuence the psychic
costs of migration. Return migration is usually associated with lower, but still substantial costs.
2100 000, which is within the range of two average annual incomes. This cost estimate is
substantially lower than the cost estimates of previous studies. Moreover, we show that
applying the techniques present in other papers, we would obtain higher cost estimates
also from data generated by a simulation of our structural model with the estimated
parameters. Consequently, we conclude that keeping track of the distribution of migra-
tion incentives over time has an important inﬂuence on migration cost estimates. This
ﬁnding extends the role of self-selection problems to a dynamic setup, which so far have
been highlighted in static frameworks (see for example Borjas 1987, 1992, Tunali, 2000,
and Hunt and Mueller, 2004).
Finding more reasonable cost estimates parallels the results of the investment liter-
ature, in which much more reasonable adjustment cost estimates where obtained when
ﬁxed adjustment costs to capital were included into dynamic models. For migration,
the issue of ﬁxed and sunk costs was emphasized in the real-options approach by Burda
(1993) and Burda et al. (1998). However, these papers only look at migration as a once
and for all decision, so that they preclude return migration. Moreover, the papers do
not study the evolution of migration incentives to which past migration decisions feed
back.
Taking into account these feedbacks, we extend the structural approaches of DGL
(2001) and KW (2005) and suggest a fully structural model of migration that is based
upon a dynamic optimization and hence takes into account the dynamic character of
the migration decision. This allows us to track the dynamic evolution of migration
incentives at the macro level, but it comes at the cost that we have to reduce the model
to a bi-regional setup for numerical feasibility. One distinct feature of our model is that
it allows to infer the structural microeconomic parameters of the migration decision from
aggregrate data only.
Beyond the application to migration decisions, our treatment of the dynamic self-
selection problem may be applicable to other important discrete choices in an economy,
for example labor-market participation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief discus-
sion on the diﬃculties of estimating structural migration models when the population
dynamically self selects into their prefered region. It develops the main motive of our
paper and illustrates why migration costs are hard to identify by standard (discrete
choice) estimation techniques. Thereafter, Section 3 presents a tractable dynamic mi-
croeconomic model of the migration decision, which assumes that an agent maximizes
future expected well-being by location choice. In Section 4 we show how to aggregate
these microeconomic migration decisions. We derive the contemporaneous law of mo-
3tion of the distribution of migration incentives and aggregate migration rates taking into
account the heterogeneity at the microeconomic level. We provide the results of a nu-
merical simulation analysis in Section 5 to give an idea how the proposed model actually
behaves. Section 6 ﬁnally confronts the model with aggregate data on migration between
US states and derives estimates of the structural parameters of the model, especially on
migration costs. Section 7 concludes and an appendix provides detailed proofs as well
as details on the employed data.
2 What makes migration costs so hard to identify?
Most micro studies and now also more macro studies on migration link the individual
migration decision to a probabilistic model in which agents migrate if the gain in utility







= γxit + νit, (1)
is large enough and exceeds some threshold value ¯ c.2 This threshold value ¯ c can be
interpreted as migration costs in utility terms. The vector of covariates xit is composed
of information that describes the economic incentives to migrate, i.e. the gains from
migration.
For example, xit could contain data on remuneration, on labor market conditions and
on amenities for both the home and the destination region. The parameter γ measures
the sensitivity of the migration decision to these economic incentives. The stochastic
component νit reﬂects diﬀerences across agents, omitted migration incentives, and / or
some variability of migration costs.
Typically, we are interested in the structural parameters γ and ¯ c and hence would
estimate some version of (1) to infer these parameters. Unfortunately, such direct ap-
proach is very diﬃcult due to the unobservability of the potential migration gains. To
illustrate this point, suppose an agent only cares about the diﬀerence in income between
home and destination region.
In such setting xit were simply a measure of relative income potentials for an agent
which she can realize by location choice. A rational agent then moves to the region where
she earns the most, provided that her migration costs are covered by the discounted
present value of the diﬀerences in future incomes.
However, the econometrician can only observe the income that an agent realizes in the
region in which she is currently living. Therefore, the other, the unobserved, potential
2See for example DGL (2001), KW (2005), or Hunt and Mueller (2004).
4income has to be proxied. Typically it is proxied by an income a similar agent realizes
in the other region.3 At a macro level, this often means replacing agent speciﬁci n c o m e
diﬀerences across regions by average income diﬀerences across regions, see for example
DGL (2001).
If we proxy the unobservable income diﬀerence xit for the individual i in equation







= γ¯ x.t + γ (xit − ¯ x.t)+νit | {z }
composed error term
. (2)
The composed error term [γ (xit − ¯ x.t)+νit] now also includes the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of income diﬀerences (xit − ¯ x.t). Since we do not want to base our following
argument on a classical measurement error or omitted variable problem, assume that
the idiosyncratic component to the income diﬀerence ηit := (xit − ¯ x.t) is orthogonal to
the average income diﬀerence. For the ease of exposition, also suppose the agent really
just cares about income, so that the true stochastic component is actually identical to
zero, νit ≡ 0.







= γ¯ x.t + γηit. (3)
In this equation the regression residual only captures the distribution of idiosyncratic
potential income diﬀerences around the mean.
While the migration decision is deterministic to the individual in this setting, it is
stochastic to the econometrician due to his lack of knowledge of ηit. If the econometrician
were to know the distribution of the unobserved component ηit, he could nonetheless
estimate γ with a suitable probabilistic decision model, e.g. a logit or probit model.
However, assuming one of the standard distributions for ηit which does not evolve over
time is problematic.
Suppose, agents are heterogeneous with respect to income potentials so that ηit
has a non-degenerated distribution. In particular assume that ηit is initially normally
distributed as displayed in Figure 1 (a), so that in the initial situation a probit model
were appropriate. The ﬁgure displays the distribution of ¯ x.t+ηit. Low values of this sum
imply that income in region A is favorable, high values imply better income prospects in
3One example is the paper of Hunt and Mueller (2004) that does a Mincer type wage regression to
obtain the unobservable income potential. A similar example can be found in Burda et al. (1998) or
KW (2005). For macro-data, an example is DGL (2001).
5Figure 1: Distribution of potential income in region B relative to A
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(c) conditional on living in region A
after migration and idiosyncratic shocks
region B. The ﬁgure assumes zero migration costs, so that all agents with ¯ x.t + ηit < 0
decide to live in region A and they decide to live in region B otherwise. The agents
self-select into the region that is favorable for them. 4
As a result, the distribution of income diﬀerences changes for the next period. No
agent who lives in region A prefers to live in region B. This means that for those agents
who live in region A the distribution of income diﬀerences is as displayed in Figure 1(b).
Eﬀectively, the right hand part of the distribution in Figure 1 (a) has been cut, because
a l la g e n t sw i t hh i g h e ri n c o m ei nr e g i o nB have actually chosen B as the region to live
in.
It can be seen that the migration incentives ¯ x.t+ηit are no longer normally distributed
4This self-selection is driven directly by the heterogeneity of the agents with respect to income po-
tentials, but is does not reﬂect immanent and ﬁxed diﬀerences of the regions as in Borjas (1992).
6conditional on a household living in region A. Since the estimation residual γηit in our
setup results from a linear transformation of the migration incentive ¯ x.t + ηit, also the
estimation residual γηit is no longer normally distributed. Accordingly, the distributional
assumptions to estimate (1) by standard maximum likelihood techniques are no longer
fulﬁlled.
Even adding a normally distributed idiosyncratic income shock does not reestablish a
normal distribution of income diﬀerences, if income diﬀerences are suﬃciently persistent.
Figure 1 (c) displays how mild idiosyncratic shocks alter the distribution displayed in
Figure 1 (b). Again the distribution is diﬀerent from the standard distributions assumed
in the estimation of binary choice models. The colored-in region indicates the set of
agents that will migrate from A to B after the idiosyncratic shock.
Now, how does this correspond to an unreasonable estimate of migration costs? If
¯ c is normalized to 1, the parameter γ has a straightforward interpretation. It measures
the sensitivity of migration decisions to income incentives and its inverse, 1
γ, is exactly
t h ei n c o m ed i ﬀerential at which an average agent is just indiﬀerent between moving and
not moving Or to put it diﬀerently, ¯ c
γ is the money measure of average migration costs.
In turn, this implies that a bias in γ directly translates into a bias in estimated
migration costs. And with the distribution of migration incentives misspeciﬁed, γ will
be estimated with a bias most probably. The misspeciﬁcation of the distribution has two
aspects. One is that the distribution will always be non standard, i.e. neither normal
nor logistic. The second aspect is that the distribution also changes over time as a result
of aggregate shocks to income and the triggered migration decisions.
To put it simply: Agents are in a certain region most likely because they are better
oﬀ living there. Because of this self selection, the distribution of unobserved migration
incentives is most likely not symmetric (see Greenwood, 1985, pp. 533). Additionally,
it displays a dynamic behavior. Accordingly, one needs to keep track of the evolution
of the incentive distributions and standard techniques to deal with self selection cannot
be applied in a straightforward way. Therefore, we develop a model based on dynamic
optimal migration decisions, which can be aggregated and used to simulate the evolution
of migration incentives over time.
3 A simple stochastic model of migration decisions
We consider an economy with two regions, A and B. For simplicity, this economy is
assumed to be inhabited by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents of measure 1.5 We
model the economy in discrete time and at each point in time an agent has to decide in
5This assumption can be justiﬁed by altruism of parents to their children.
7which region to live and work. First, we consider the decision problem of an individual
agent. For simplicity, we drop the index i that has denoted the speciﬁc individual before,
but use this index to indicate regions, i = A,B.
Living in region i at time t gives the agent utility ˜ wit. Although ˜ wit is a catch-all
variable for migration incentives, which can be interpreted as wage income, employment
prospects, amenities, utility from social networks etc., we refer to ˜ wit as income for
simplicity.
The agent discounts future utility by factor β<1 and maximizes the discounted
sum of expected future utility by location choice. Moving from one region to the other
i sn o tc o s t l e s st oa na g e n t .W h e na na g e n tm o v e s ,s h ei ss u b j e c tt oad i s u t i l i t yct that
enters additively in her utility function.
Hence, the instantaneous utility function u(i,j,t) is given by
u(i,j,t)= ˜ wit − Ij6=ict (4)
for an agent that has lived in region j before and now lives in region i. Here, I denotes
an indicator function, which equals 1 if the agent has moved from region j to i and 0 if
the agent already lived in region i before.
Both, migration incentive (income ˜ wit) and moving costs (ct), are stochastic variables
in our model. They vary over time and across individuals, but are observed by the agent
before she chooses her location. The agent knows the distribution of both components of
her utility function and forms rational expectations about future incomes and migration
costs.
Since migration costs are stochastic and hence vary, not all individual agents who
f a c et h es a m ei n c o m ed i ﬀerential will actually take the same migration decision. In this
sense, the individuals in our model are heterogenous and to the outside observer the
migration decision is stochastic.
With both ˜ wit and ct being stochastic, the potential migrant waits not only for good
income opportunities but also for low migration costs. In her migration decision, she
thus takes into account two option values. One is the value to wait and learn more about
future incomes and the other is to wait and search for lower migration costs.
Migration costs themselves depend on many factors and may include both physical
and psychic costs of migration (Sjaastad, 1962), but the factors that determine migration
costs are not constant. For example, search costs to ﬁnd a new job and accommodation
evolve with market conditions, the disutility of living separated from a family or partner
changes over time, just as marital status itself is neither constant nor irreversible.
8We pick up the variability in migration costs ct by assuming them to be independently
and identically distributed according to a distribution function G. In the simulation and
in the estimation of our model, we specify G to be a Gamma distribution.
The distribution of migration incentives, ˜ wit, is assumed to be log-normal. In partic-
ular, we assume that log income, wit, follows an AR(1) process with normally distributed
innovations ξit and autoregressive coeﬃcient ρ :
ln( ˜ wit)= :wit = µi (1 − ρ)+ρwit−1 + ξit. (5)
This process holds for the whole continuum of agents and each agent draws an own series
of innovations ξit. The expected value of log income in region i is µi.T h ei n n o v a t i o n s
ξit have mean zero, are serially uncorrelated, but may be correlated across regions A,B
and across agents (see Section 4.2).
Income and cost distributions, together with the utility function and the discount
factor deﬁne the decision problem for the potential migrant. This is an optimization
problem, which is described by the following Bellman equation
V (j,ct,w At,w Bt)= m a x
i=A,B
©
exp(wit) − I{i6=j}ct + βEtV (i,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1)
ª
. (6)
In this equation, Et denotes the expectations operator with respect to information avail-
able at time t.6
The optimal policy is relatively simple. The agent migrates from region j to region
i i fa n do n l yi ft h ec o s to fm i g r a t i o na r el o w e rt h a nt h es u mo ft h ee x p e c t e dv a l u e
gain βEt [V (i,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1) − V (j,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1)] and the direct beneﬁts
of migration expwit − expwjt. T h i sm e a n st h ea g e n tm i g r a t e si fa n do n l yi f
ct ≤ expwit−expwjt+βEt[V (i,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1) − V (j,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1)]. (7)
The value diﬀerence
Et [V (i,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1) − V (j,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1)]
may for example reﬂect diﬀerent income expectations. Holding income expectations
6For technical reasons, we need to assume boundedness of ξit, so that ξit is in fact only approximately
normal. The bounds to ξit turn the optimization problem into a bounded returns problem, which is
easier to solve. But the bounds to ξit can be chosen arbitrarily wide (but ﬁnite) so that the distribution
of ξit approximates the log-normal distribution arbitrarily close. Existence and uniqueness of the value
function is proved in the appendix.
9constant, the diﬀerence of the expected values also reﬂects the diﬀerences in expected
future migration costs.
Since the costs of migration, ct, are assumed to be i.i.d., expected costs at time
t +1do not depend on information available at time t. Moreover, the distribution of
future incomes (wA,t+1,w B,t+1) is a function of only (wAt,w Bt), because wit follows a
Markov-process. This allows us to summarize the expected value diﬀerence by a function
∆V (wAt,w Bt) of only (wAt,w Bt), which is deﬁned as
∆V (wAt,w Bt): =βEt [V (B,ct+1,w A,t+1,w B,t+1) − V (A,ct+1,w A,t+1,w Bt,+1)]. (8)
Substituting (8) for the value diﬀerence in (7) gives a critical level of costs ¯ c at which
an agent living in region A is just indiﬀerent between moving and not moving to region
B. This threshold is
¯ c(wA,w B): =e x pwB − expwA + ∆V (wAt,w Bt). (9)
To put it diﬀerently, a person moves from A to B if and only if
ct ≤ ¯ cA := ¯ c(wAt,w Bt).
Conversely, a person living in region B moves to region A if and only if
ct ≤ ¯ cB := −¯ c(wAt,w Bt).
Note that ¯ c can be positive as well as negative. If ¯ c is positive, region B is more attractive.
If it is negative, region A is more attractive and a person living in region A would only
have an incentive to move to region B if migration costs were negative.
4 Aggregate migration and the dynamics of income distributions
4.1 Aggregate migration
Given this trigger rationale for migration, the hazard rate
Λi (wA,w B): =G(¯ ci (wA,w B)) , i = A,B.
is the probability that a person in region i moves to the other region if she faces the
potential incomes (wA,w B). This means that the likelihood of a person to move equals
the probability that her migration costs realize below the threshold value ¯ ci. Since we






































assumed a continuum of agents the actual fraction of migrating agents with income
pair (wA,w B) is equal to this hazard rate, too. Figure 2 displays an example of a
microeconomic migration-hazard function that stems from the optimization problem (6).
The ﬁgure shows how diﬀerent income combinations change the probability to migrate
from region A to B.
Now consider the distribution Ft of (potential) incomes (wA,w B) and household
locations. Suppose this income distribution is the distribution after the income shocks
ξit have been realized, but before migration decisions have been taken. Let fit denote
the conditional density of this income distribution, conditional on the household living
in region i at time t. Then, the actual fraction ¯ Λit of households living in i that migrate
to the other region evaluates as
¯ Λit :=
Z
Λi (wA,w B) · fit (wA,w B)dwAdwB. (10)
This means that the aggregate migration hazard, ¯ Λit, is a convolution of the micro-
economic adjustment hazard Λi and the conditional income distribution fit. In other
words, the aggregate migration hazard can be thought of as a weighted mean of all mi-
croeconomic migration hazards, weighted by the density of income pairs (wA,w B) from
distribution Ft.
4.2 Dynamics of income distributions
The distribution Ft itself (and hence fit) evolves over time and is a result of direct shocks
to income just as it is a result past migration. We need to characterize the law of motion
11for F to close our model and to obtain the sequence of aggregate migration hazards.
4.2.1 The eﬀect of migration on income distributions
Since the microeconomic migration hazard depends on (wA,w B), diﬀerent potential
incomes in both regions result in diﬀerent propensities to migrate. In consequence,
migration changes not only the fraction Pit of households living in region i at time t, but
also the conditional distribution of income, fit. For example, households living in region
A, earning a low current income, wA, but facing a substantially higher potential income in
B, wB, are very likely to migrate. As a result, the number of those households strongly
decreases after migration decisions have been taken, while the number of households
f a c i n gas m a l l e ri n c o m ed i ﬀerential changes less.
These considerations form the backbone of our argument. The distribution of mi-
gration incentives is a result of past migration decisions, and we can express the new
density of households with income (wA,w B) in region i after migration, ˆ fit, by
ˆ fit(wA,w B)=[ 1− Λit(wA,w B)]
fit (wA,w B)Pi,t
Pi,t+1




The ﬁrst product and part of the sum gives the fraction of households that remain in
region i. In this product, the probability [1 − Λit (wA,w B)] is the probability to stay in
region i. The term, fit (wA,w B)Pi,t, weights this probability and is the unconditional
income density for region i before migration has taken place. To obtain again the con-
ditional density, the unconditional income density, fit (wA,w B)Pi,t, is divided by Pi,t+1,
which is the fraction (or probability) of households living in region i after migration (i.e.
in time t +1 ) .
Analogously, the second part of the sum is constructed: Λ−it (wA,w B) is the prob-
ability to migrate from the other region, −i, to destination region i, f−it (wA,w B)P−i,t
is the unconditional income density for region −i and dividing by Pi,t+1 conditions for
living in region i after migration.
The proportion of households living in region i at time t +1is itself a result of
migration decisions. For the law of motion for Pi,t+1, we obtain
Pit+1 =
¡
1 − ¯ Λit
¢
Pit + ¯ Λ−itP−it. (12)
The number of households living in i is composed of those that stay,
¡
1 − ¯ Λit
¢
Pit,
and those that come ¯ Λ−itP−it.
124.2.2 The eﬀect of income shocks on the income distribution
Besides migration, also shocks to income change the distribution of income pairs, F.
These shocks can be purely idiosyncratic or may eﬀect all individuals in the economy.
For a single agent, we can decompose the total shock ξit to her potential income in region
i (see equation 5) into an aggregate component θit and an individual speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t
ωit :
ξit = θit + ωit.
The aggregate shock θit for region i hits all agents equally and changes their potential
income for region i. It is important to note that this shock does not depend on the actual
region the agent lives in. For example, a positive shock θAt > 0 increases the potential
income in region A for agents that currently live in region A as well as for agents that
currently live in region B. They realize this potential income by deciding to actually live
in region A. If both θAt and θBt are positive (negative) both regions become more (less)
attractive. Income increases more in the region which has the relatively larger shock.
Hence, aggregate shocks θ measure economy wide business cycles as well as regional
cycles such as local demand or supply shocks. These regional cycles could also result from
diﬀerent technology or industry mixes in both regions, which lead to diﬀerent responses
to general shocks to productivity.
Statistically, the economy wide business cycle is the common component in (θA,θB).
If this business cycle component is more important relative to the regional cycles, then
the correlation ψθ between θA and θB is large.
However, aggregate shocks are not the only source of income variation for an agent.
Agents diﬀer in various personal characteristics that result in diﬀerent income proﬁles
over time. Individuals diﬀer in their skills and while the demand may grow for the skill
of one person, demand may deteriorate for another person’s skills. This heterogeneity
is captured by the idiosyncratic shocks (ωAt,ωBt). If ωAt is positive, income prospects
of the individual agent increase in region A. The correlation ψω between ωA and ωB
reﬂects economy wide demand shifts for a person’s individual skills.
Persistency in incomes is captured by the autoregressive parameter ρ in equation (5).
W ea b s t a i nf r o mt h ei n c l u s i o no fp e r m a n e n t l yﬁxed individual diﬀerences (ﬁxed eﬀects)
primarily because this makes the model numerically much more tractable.7
If the variance of idiosyncratic shocks ω is large relative to the variance of aggre-
gate shocks θ, heterogeneity among agents plays a large role and has a big inﬂuence in
7If we were to include ﬁxed eﬀects that reﬂect diﬀerent types of agents, the model had to be solved
for each diﬀerent agent type just as it is now solved for the single type of agent.
13determining one’s income. Since we assume aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to be
independent, the variance of the total shock to income, ξit, i st h es u mo ft h ev a r i a n c e s




The income distribution at the beginning of the next period, Ft+1, now results from
adding idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to the distribution of income after migration in
period t, ˆ Ft, of which ˆ fit (wA,w B) is the conditional density, see (11). When a household
has income wit+1 in period t +1 , this can result from any possible combination of wit
and ξit = θit + ωit for which
wit+1 = µi (1 − ρ)+ρwit + θit + ωit (13)
holds. Solving this equation for wit we obtain
w∗
i := wit =







i (wit+1,θit,ωit) is the current potential income in region i that is consistent with
a future potential income of wit+1 and realizations of shocks θit + ωit in period t. Now
suppose that both kinds of shocks, θ and ω, have been realized. Then, w∗
A,B is a one to
one mapping of future income (wA,t+1,w B,t+1) to current income (wA,t,w B,t).
The conditional density of observing the future income pair (wA,t+1,w B,t+1) can thus
be obtained from a retrospective. The income pair (w∗
A,w∗
B) of past incomes corresponds
uniquely to a future income pair (wA,t+1,w B,t+1). Consequently, we can express the
density of the income distribution at time t +1using the income distribution after
migration ˆ Ft, and its conditional density ˆ fit . T h ed e n s i t yo ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n
Ft+1 conditional on the region and the vector of shocks is given by
fit+1 (wA,w B|θA,θB,ωA,ωB)= ˆ fit(w∗
A (wA,θA,ωA),w∗
B (wB,θB,ωB)). (15)
Weighting this density with the density of the idiosyncratic shocks h(ωAt,ωBt) yields
the density of observing the future income pair (w∗
A,w ∗




B (wB,t+1,θBt,ωBt)) · h(ωAt,ωBt).
Integrating over all possible idiosyncratic shocks (ωAt,ωBt) gives the density fit+1 of






B (wB,θBt,ωBt)) · h(ωA,ωB)dωAdωB. (16)
For given aggregate shocks, this new distribution determines migration from region i to
region −i a c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n(10) for time t +1 .
The evolution of income distributions can thus be summarized as follows. Between
two consecutive periods, the conditional distribution of potential incomes ﬁrst evolves
as a result of migration decisions, moving the density from fit to ˆ fit. Thereafter, the
distribution is again altered by aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to income, moving
the density from ˆ fit to fi,t+1. The latter density now determines migration decisions in
time t +1 , starting the cycle over again. In other words, migration is not only a result
of past income shocks, but also a result of past migration decisions. Keeping track of
the distributional dynamics of migration incentives is at the heart of our model. This is
the diﬀerence to most other empirical models of migration.
5 Simulation analysis
5.1 Numerical aspects
The ﬁrst step in solving the model numerically is to obtain a solution to (6). We do so
by value-function iteration.8 For this value-function iteration, we ﬁrst approximate the





= wt = µ(1 − ρ)+ρwt−1 + ξt (17)
by a Markov chain.9 Because wA and wB are correlated through the correlation structure






of (wA,w B) in the
value function iteration.
We evaluate the value function on an equispaced grid for the orthogonal compo-
n e n t sw i t haw i d t ho f±4σ+
A,B around their means, where σ+
A,B denote the long run
standard deviations of the orthogonal components. The grid is chosen to capture al-
8See for example Adda and Cooper (2003) for an overview of dynamic programming techniques.
9To save on notation we drop the regional index of a variable pair like (wAt,w Bt) and just denote the
pair by wt.
15most all movements of the income distribution F later on.10 Given this grid, we can use
Tauchen’s (1986) algorithm to obtain the transition probabilities for the Markov-chain
approximation of the income process in (17).
We apply a multigrid algorithm (see Chow and Tsitsiklis, 1991) to speed up the
calculation of the value function. This algorithm works iteratively. It ﬁrst solves the
dynamic programming problem for a coarse grid and then doubles the number of grid-
points in each iteration until the grid is ﬁne enough. In between iterations the solution
for the coarser grid is used to generate the initial guess for the value-function iteration of
the new grid. The initial grid has 16×16×32 points (income A × income B × migration
costs) and the ﬁnal grid has 128×128 points for income and 256 points for migration
costs.11
The solution of (6) yields the optimal migration policy and thus the microeconomic
migration-hazard rates Λi. With these hazard rates we can obtain a series of aggregate
migration rates for a simulated economy as described in detail in Section 4.2 for any
realization of aggregate shocks (θt)t=1...T a n da ni n i t i a ld i s t r i b u t i o nF0.
This means that we need an initial distribution of income F0 to solve the sequen-
tial problem. Following Caballero and Engel’s (1999) suggestion, we use the ergodic
distribution of income ¯ F that would be obtained in the absence of aggregate income
shocks. This distribution is calculated by assuming that idiosyncratic shocks ω have the
full variance of ξ. I nt h ea p p e n d i x ,w es h o wt h a tt h es e q u e n c eo fi n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n s
converges to a unique ergodic distribution ¯ F in the absence of aggregate shocks. This
ergodic distribution ¯ F is a natural starting guess for F0 as Caballero and Engel (1999)
argue.
















10The choice of ±4σ
+
A,B is motivated as follows. We later assume in the simulations that 95% of the
income shocks is due to the idiosyncratic component. Therefore, we can expect 99.9% of the mass of the




A,B ∼ = ±3.26σ
+
A,B around the mean of the distribution for







A,B in again 99.9% of all years. Since the sum of both is 3.73σ
+
A,B, a grid variation of ±4σ
+
A,B
should not truncate the income distribution.
11To obtain the grid for migration costs, we ﬁrst discretize the [0;1] interval into an equispaced grid.
Then we choose the grid points for the migration costs as the values of the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of the costs evaluated at the equispaced grid. This yields a cost grid whose grid
points are equally likely to realize. By contrast to the income distribution, using such an "equally-likely
grid" is possible for the cost distribution, because the cost distribution is strictly stationary. Unlike the
income distribution, it does not move due to aggregate shocks. See Adda and Cooper (2003) or Tauchen
(1986) for the analog case of a stationary Markov chain with normal innovations.
16weight φ measures the relative importance of aggregate shocks, relative to idiosyncratic
shocks, i.e. σ2
ω =( 1− φ)σ2
ξ and σ2
θ = φσ2
ξ. Correspondingly, the orthogonal components







A number of parameters has to be determined to actually simulate our model numerically.
The probably most important parameter choice concerns the distribution of migration
costs. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume migration costs to be Gamma-












This distribution has two parameters a and b which determine the mean ab and the
coeﬃcient of variation b−1
2. Although the mean cost is ab, one should note that the
average cost paid by a migrant is smaller as she will wait and search for low migration
costs. In our simulations, we try three parameter combinations (a,b) to see their inﬂuence
on the dynamics of interregional migration. One parameter constellation with high, one
with medium and one with almost zero migration costs. This allows us to asses the
sensitivity of aggregate migration to moving costs. In particular, we are interested to
see whether the high migration cost estimates reported in the literature are compatible
with aggregate migration data in the light of our model.
The second important set of parameters describes the process for income and the
income shocks ξ. We need to specify the autocorrelation parameter ρ and the mean µ
o ft h ei n c o m ep r o c e s sa sw e l la st h ec o v a r i a n c es t r u c t u r eo ft h ei n c o m es h o c k s . T h e
covariance structure is composed of the variance of income shocks σ2
ξ, the correlation of
income shocks between regions, ψθ (aggregate) and ψω (idiosyncratic), and the fraction φ
of the income shock that is due to aggregate factors, i.e. the covariance across individual
agents.
We take the parameters for the income process mainly from the recent paper of
Storesletten et al. (2004). They estimate the dynamics of idiosyncratic labor market risk
for the US and report both income variances and autocorrelation of log household income
based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They ﬁnd an annual autocorrelation of
roughly 0.95 and a standard deviation of idiosyncratic income shocks ranging from 0.09
to 0.14 for business cycle expansions and from 0.16t o0 . 2 5f o rb u s i n e s sc y c l ec o n t r a c t i o n s
(see Storesletten et al. 2004, Table 2). They report a frequency weighted average of 0.17
for those standard deviations in their preferred speciﬁcation (Stoesletten et al. 2004,
17pp. 711). Overall, their results imply a range of 0.125 to 0.192 for the average standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic income shock, taking means of their point estimates for
contractions and expansions. Since we do not model diﬀerent variances of idiosyncratic
shocks to income along the business cycle, we use their preferred average value of 0.17
for the simulations.12
Besides the autocorrelation and variance terms, Storesletten et al. (2004) also report
a mean income of about US$ 45 000. To approximately match this ﬁgure, we choose the
mean of the log income to be µ ∼ = 10.5.13
Unfortunately, Storesletten et al. (2004) do not report numbers on aggregate income
risk, so that we need to take this data from a diﬀerent source. We estimate the variance of
aggregate shocks to income from income per capita data for US states for the years 1969 -
2003 as reported in the REIS database (available online at www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/).
We deﬂate the data using the US wide consumer price index.
Taking further into account ﬁxed eﬀects and a linear trend, the residual standard
deviation of log income for US states over time is roughly 0.13. To calculate the fraction,
φ, of income risk due to aggregate ﬂuctuations, we compare our estimated aggregate
variance with the long-run idiosyncratic variance of income that is implied by Storesletten




1−ρ2 =0 .30. Hence, aggregate income risk accounts only for a fraction
of approximately 0.072
0.3+0.072 ∼ = 0.02 of total income risk.
Finally, we need to specify the correlations of shocks to income across regions, ψω
and ψθ. These correlations refer to potential incomes and are therefore inherently unob-
servable. We assume that aggregate and individual correlation coeﬃcients are equal, i.e.
ψω = ψθ, so that we only need to specify one common parameter. As a ﬁrst approxima-
tion, we measure ψ as the correlation coeﬃcient of state average income per capita and
the US average per capita income (both in logs, CPI deﬂated and taking ﬁxed eﬀects
and a linear trend into account). From the REIS database we infer a partial correlation
coeﬃcient of ˆ ψ =0 .55.
As we work with annual data, we choose the discount factor β =0 .95. Table 1
summarizes our parameter choices for the three speciﬁcations that we simulate.
12Other studies on the evolution of individual income report similar values, see the discussion in
Storesletten et al. (2004).






where µ and σ
2 are the mean and
variance of the logs.
18Table 1: Parameter choices for the simulation analysis
Storesletten REIS Model Speciﬁcations
et al. (2004) data (1) (2) (3)
Gamma Parameter a — — 600 300 1
Gamma Parameter b —— 3 0 0 150 1
Fraction of aggregate shocks φ — 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
C o r r e l a t i o no fs h o c k s





1−ρ2 0.301 — 0 . 3 20 . 3 20 . 3 2
Autocorrelation of income ρ 0 . 9 5 — 0 . 9 50 . 9 50 . 9 5
Discount factor β — — 0.95 0.95 0.95
1 Storesletten et al. (2004) report idiosyncratic variances only. To obtain the composed
variance, their estimate has to be divided by (1 − φ).
5.3 Simulation results
W es i m u l a t eo u rm o d e lf o r5 1 pairs of regions and 26 years, but we drop the ﬁrst 10
years for each region to minimize the inﬂuence of our initial choice of F0. This generates
a simulated dataset for migration data that has the same size as the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) area to area migration ﬂow data, which we use as a benchmark. Income
data is taken from the REIS database, CPI deﬂated and in logs. A detailed data descrip-
tion for both IRS and REIS data can found in the data appendix. In order to minimize
simulation uncertainty we replicate each simulation 10 times and report the averages
over the simulations.
Of course the actual migrant faces a more complex decision problem than the one
simulated in our model of two regions. Including D.C. as a destination region, an agent
has to decide between 50 possible alternatives states where she can move to. To make
this comparable to our model, the 50 alternatives have to be aggregated to a single
complementary region. The population weighted average income over all alternative 50
states is used as the average income of the alternative region.
To characterize the results of the simulation exercise, we have to calculate a number
19of moments from the simulated dataset and compare these moments to the moments
we observe from the actual IRS and REIS data. This comparison tells us how well our
model is capable to replicate characteristic features of the actual migration and income
data at an aggregate level. In particular, it tells us which of the three considered levels
of migration costs is best compatible with the observed structure of the data. Such way
of inference is frequently applied in the literature on real business cycles, see Backus et
al. (1992) or Baxter and Crucini (1993) and many others.
The lines along which this literature has typically described aggregate ﬂuctuations
guides our choice of characterizing moments: variances, covariances, autocorrelations and
means. We compare average migration rates, the standard deviation of annual migration
rates, their autocorrelation and the cross-correlation of migration-rates. Besides, we look
at the implications of the diﬀerent migration cost regimes on the level and ﬂuctuations of
average incomes. To measure the cyclical behavior of migration, we calculate the mean
of in- and outmigration rates and correlate this with the average income in both regions,





Table 2 reports the results of our simulation exercise. The ﬁrst experiment uses cost
parameters close to what has been reported in the literature. We assume a = 600 and
b =3 0 0to match an average migration cost of US$ 180 000 as reported in DGL (2001).
The results of this experiment are displayed in column (1) of Table 2.
Compared to the actual data, the annual migration rates are by far too low. While
we observe an annual average migration rate of 3.9%, the model predicts a migration
rate of only 1.0%. With US$ 180 000, migration costs are just prohibitively high. Also
migration rates ﬂuctuate less in the simulated data than in the actual data. Simulated
migration rates are too much procyclical and the cross-correlation of incomes is 0.682,
while the correlation of shocks ψ was set to be 0.55.
In summary, we obtain too little migration and too little ﬂuctuation of the migra-
tion rates, while income ﬂuctuation is realistic. Therefore, we try a speciﬁcation with
lower migration costs. We set a =3 0 0and b =1 5 0 , so that expected migration costs
are devided by four and now equal an average annual income of US$ 45 000. With
these lower migration costs, migration rates more than double and are with 2.5% within
a more realistic range. Migration also becomes less procyclical and the ﬂuctuation of
income decreases. At the same time, migration rates themselves ﬂuctuate more. Con-
sequently, the lower cost speciﬁcation more closely replicates observed data. However,
in- and outmigration seem to be too strongly negatively correlated. A further result of
lower migration costs is an increase in average income by 3% compared to the high cost
speciﬁcation. With lower migration costs, the agents are more often in the region where
20Table 2: Simulation Results
Data high medium zero
costs (1) costs (2) costs (3)
average annual migration rate 0.039 0.010 0.025 0.102
standard deviation of annual migration rates 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.018
Autocorrelation of migration rates1 0.807 0.438 0.436 -0.011
Cross correlation of migration rates2 0.045 -0.774 -.919 -0.985
mean of log average income 10.710 10.794 10.823 10.832
standard deviation of log average income 0.071 0.073 0.063 0.062
Cross correlation of log average income 2 0.550 0.682 0.7140 . 8 5 3
Variance of household income 0.299 0.320 0.290 0.275
Correlation of ¯ Λi + ¯ Λ−i and ¯ wi +¯ w−i
(procyclicality)2 0.225 0.757 0.596 0.037
1 Coeﬃcient of the autoregressive parameter in a ﬁxed eﬀects regression with linear
time trend.
2 Partial correlation controlling for a linear time trend.
their income is larger.
While the ﬁrst scenario displayed an extreme bound of very high migration costs, the
third scenario of almost no migration costs provides a lower extreme bound. It clearly
shows how inﬂuential it is to keep track of the evolution of migration incentives. As KW
(2005, p. 28) point out, in a model in which migration incentives are drawn randomly,
we should observe migration rates of 50% in the absence of migration costs. By contrast,
our model predicts a substantially lower migration rate of 10.2% when migration costs
are absent. This diﬀerence to Kennan and Walker’s intuitive result stems from the fact
that migration incentives are not drawn purely randomly in our model. Instead, they
depend on previous migration incentives and decisions.
Besides this main point, we see that the procyclicality of migration rates drops further
21and in fact becomes too low. The cross correlation of migration rates becomes almost
perfectly negative.
Overall, our simulation results do not yet allow a decisive assessment which level of
migration costs ﬁts the data best. The average migration rates and their ﬂuctuations are
best captured by the medium cost formulation. When we look at the cross correlation of
migration rates the high cost speciﬁcation seems most plausible. Finally, low migration
costs imply the best match of the observed low procyclicality of migration rates.
6 Estimation
In order to ﬁnd the parameters of our model that allow to match closest the observed
patterns of migration that are in the data, we rely on an indirect inference procedure.
Indirect inference procedures have been proposed by Smith (1993) and Gourieroux et
al. (1993) to obtain estimates of structural parameters when the likelihood function of
the structural model becomes intractable, as in our setting. In particular, we apply the
simulated quasi-maximum likelihood (SQML) method developed in Smith (1993). This
method avoids the estimation or choice of a weighting matrix and hence is arguably more
robust in small samples (Smith, 1993).
6.1 Methodology
Indirect inference is the natural extension of the simulation exercise presented in the
previous section. The central idea behind this methodology is to use an auxiliary sta-
tistical model to describe the observed patterns of the data, and then to calibrate and
simulate the structural economic model such that the auxiliary statistical model is best
replicated by the simulation.
Accordingly, we ﬁrst estimate an auxiliary model that describes observed migration
data x in a reduced form using a quasi maximum likelihood approach. This means
we select vector of reduced form parameters ¯   that maximizes the likelihood function
L(x, ). Thereafter, we simulate the migration model as described in the previous sec-
tion for a vector of structural parameters β and thus generate artiﬁcial data y.T h e s e
simulated data are then used to estimate reduced form parameters ˆ  (β) as maximizers of
L(y(β), ). Finally, we choose ˆ β such that the likelihood of the actual data L(x,ˆ  (β))
under ˆ   becomes maximal. A comparison of the unrestricted maximum likelihood es-
timate ¯   and the the estimate under the restrictions imposed by the structural model,
ˆ  (β), then tells us how well our economic model is able to describe the observed data
in the light of the reduced form.
In other words, we can understand the auxiliary model as a lens through which we
22look at both the model and the observed data. Consequently, the choice of the auxiliary
model is important (in particular in small samples). A number of studies of migration
has suggested to regress either net migration or immigration on income diﬀerentials
as the canonical approach to aggregate migration data (see Greenwood, 1997 for an
overview). We follow this suggestion in the choice of our auxiliary model and regress
aggregate immigration rates on the average incomes of both regions. In particular, we
assume the following functional form
imit = 0 +  1 ¯ wit +  2 ¯ w−it + εit (19)
εit = 3εit−1 + νit. (20)
Immigration imit to state i is depends on both the average income ¯ wit in state i and the
average income in the alternative region ¯ w−it. The constant term  0 reﬂects that in both
our model and in reality there is an equilibrium level of migration due to idiosyncratic




capture not only the sensitivity of migration to
economic incentives, but also the procyclicality of migration ( 1 +  2).
We allow for the possibility of autocorrelation in the error term to pick up a certain
degree of persistency in migration rates that is both present in the actual and the simu-
lated data. The persistency in aggregate migration rates results from the autocorrelation
ρ of individual incomes, see (5). Finally, the variance σ2
ν of the shock νit picks up the
variability in migration.


























The error terms νit are obtained as the residuals from the quasi-diﬀerenced data (see
e.g. Greene, 2003, pp. 272).
For our simulated theoretical model all states i and j are mutually independent. For
the observed data, we assume that this also holds approximately. Under this assumption



























Maximizing this likelihood provides us with the reduced form parameter estimates
 0,  1,  2,  3 and σ2
ν.
23Table 3: Reduced Form Estimation Results
parameter intercept ( 0) destination source
income ( 1) income ( 2)
estimate -0.1037 0.0452 -0.0318
standard errors (0.0693) (0.0067) (0.0082)











Table 3 displays the point estimates of the parameters for the reduced form model from
t h eI R Sa n dR E I Sd a t a .
One can see that immigration to state i responds more strongly to the wage in state
i than to the wage in source state −i. Suppose that income equally grows in all US
states, then all states experience an increase in immigration, so that the overall mobility
measured by the total number of migrants increases. To put it diﬀerently, the positive
sum of  1 +  2 reﬂects a procyclicality of migration.
The substantial autocorrelation reﬂects the dynamic structure of migration, in par-
ticular it reﬂects dynamically evolving idiosyncratic migration incentives. At the same
time, it also reﬂects how well the average incomes proxy for the distribution of idio-
syncratic migration incentives. Recall from Section 2 that we loose information by
characterizing the unobserved distribution of idiosyncratic incentives by only the mean
incomes. The dynamics of the incentive distribution implies that the lost information is
correlated over time. This dynamics then manifests itself in an autocorrelation of the
error term in (19).
Table 4 displays the estimates for the structural model obtained by simulated quasi-
maximum likelihood. The estimation of the model ﬁxes all prameters besides a and b to
t h ev a l u e sw eu s e di no u rs i m u l a t i o nb e f o r e . W eo b t a i na ne x p e c t e dm i g r a t i o nc o s to f
US$ 101 645 or two average annual incomes, which lies substantially below the estimates
reported in other contributions such as DGL (2001) or KW (2005). With a coeﬃcient of
24Table 4: Reduced Form Estimation Results
parameter
expected migration costs (a · b) 101 645
(tba)




Standard errors in parenthesis.
variation of 0.0628 the migration costs do not strongly ﬂuctuate across agents in every
year.
To make these estimation results more interpretable, we report the statistics calcu-
lated for the simulation exercise also for our estimated parameters, which are displayed
in Table 5. Migration shows indeed a smoothing eﬀect on incomes. The variance of
income across households is about 0.304 although the long-run variance of income pos-
sibilities was set to 0.32. Realized incomes substantially correlate across states and the
correlation coeﬃcient is 0.728 for the model simulated with the estimated parameters.
Overall the ﬁt of our model to the descriptive statistics is relatively good. What remains
a puzzle nonetheless is the slightly positive cross sectional correlation of migration rates
and their high auto-correlation in the data, which our model cannot replicate. Moreover,
our model predicts migration rates to be much more procyclical than we observe.
6.3 Comparison of cost estimates
On the basis of the latter simulation, we may compare incurred migration costs to
the costs that would be estimated in the recent approaches to migration such as DGL
(2001). This provides further evidence on the inﬂuence of the dynamics of the incentive
distribution on the estimation of migration costs. DGL (2001) employ a random-utility
conditional-logit model to describe the migration decision. Adapted to our bi-regional
























25Table 5: Simulation Results: estimated parameters
Data Estimated
Model
average annual migration rate 0.039 0.016
standard deviation of annual migration rates 0.004 0.004
Autocorrelation of migration rates2 0.807 0.402
Cross correlation of migration rates1 0.045 -0.851
mean of log average income 10.710 10.82
std deviation of log average income 0.071 0.072
Cross correlation of log average income1 0.550 0.727
Variance of household income 0.299 0.304
Correlation of ¯ Λi + ¯ Λ−i and ¯ wi +¯ w−i (procyclicality)1 0.225 0.736
1 Partial correlation controlling for a linear time trend.
2 Coeﬃcient of the autoregressive parameter in a ﬁxed eﬀects regression with linear
time trend.
While DGL (2001) include a bunch of other variables, our simulated model just allows for
log income as an explanatory variable. Other variables such as distance or unemployment
are not prevalent in the simulation and hence cannot be included. Moreover, since we
only have two regions, we cannot estimate α and β from a cross section as DGL (2001)
do, but have to pool the simulated data.
Following DGL (2001), a random-utility conditional-logit approach could be moti-
vated by assuming that utility is composed of an income component (with sensitivity
β>0) and a disutility from migration α<0. The money measure of this disutility is
exp
³
¯ w − ˆ α
ˆ β
´
and this is DGL’s (2001)s u g g e s t i o no fam e a s u r eo fm i g r a t i o nc o s t s . 14
For the estimated parameters, the mean incurred migration costs are US$ 100 031 (see
Table 6), while the conditional logit would suggest a cost of US$ 127 731,an u m b e rt h a t
14We deviate slightly from DGL (2001) by replacing diﬀerences in relative income
exp ¯ wi
exp ¯ w−i − 1 by log
diﬀerences ¯ wi − ¯ w−i for notational ease.
26Table 6: Simulation Results: Comparison to cost estimate by DGL
Average incurred migration cost 100 031
Standard deviation
of average incurred migration costs 152
Average annual income 50 193
Migration cost estimate
b a s e do nD G L ’ sm e t h o d( 2 0 0 1) 127 731
is substantially higher. In terms of annual incomes this corresponds to 2 and 2.5 average
annual incomes respectively. This comparative exercise shows that the estimation of the
structural parameters is likely to be subject to a bias if the unobserved dynamics of the
distribution of incentives is not taken into account. Besides, it is not clear what the
cost estimate of a static decision model as the model of DGL (2001)e x a c t l ym e a s u r e s
in the context of migration being a dynamic decision and ¯ wit − ¯ w−it only capturing the
contemporaneous gain from migration.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have provided a tractable model of aggregate migration with a sound microeconomic
foundation. It is a contribution to the recently evolving literature on structural models
of migration. We explicitly deal with the problem of the unobservability of potential
gains from migration and their dynamic character. The dynamic character of migration
incentives has two aspects. First, the individual gains from migration evolve stochasti-
cally over time, but will typically display a high degree of persistency. Second, at an
aggregate level, the distribution of migration incentives is a result of past migration
decisions themselves. Starting oﬀ from the microeconomic decision problem allows us
to keep track of this dynamics of the incentive distribution. This distributional dynam-
ics may be refered to as a dynamic self-selection problem. Neglecting this self-selction
problem may result in biased estimates of structural parameters. In fact, we can infer
migration costs from our model and ﬁnd the estimated migration costs to be substan-
tially lower than those reported in previous studies that apply diﬀerent methods. We
estimate migration costs to be about 100 000 US$, corresponding to two average annual
incomes at most.
These results were obtained by indirect inference, that is by means of simulated
27quasi maximum likelihood. Our analysis calls once more for a careful treatment of the
self-selection problem when economic incentives are not fully observable. What makes
this issue in particular problematic in the migration setting is that the unobservable
incentives are highly auto-correlated though not perfectly persistent. Rather than being
drawn every period anew, migration incentives have a long memory. One example of
this long memory of migration incentives is the persistency that income displays. This
may be of importance not only to macro-studies of migration. Also at a micro level,
income potentials are typically unobservable and have to be proxied. But such approxi-
mation regularly neglects self selection. If people live in their prefered place of residence
as a result of their location choice, and if all observable things are equal, then it must
be the unobserved component of their preferences that is in favor of the place where
they actually are. Besides unobservable parts of income this unobservable component
can also comprise diﬀerent valuations of diﬀerent amenities and social networks. Also
these factors can be expected to exhibit persistency. We integrated this persistency in a
structural dynamic microeconomic model of the migration decision, which consequently
allowed us to simulate the joint behavior of the observed migration rates, of the un-
observed migration incentives, and of their observable proxies. Accordingly, simulation
based inference methods prove appropriate to overcome the selectivity problem.
Future research would call for a more complex microeconomic model that allows to
integrate more information into the macroeconomic reduced form regression model, for
example labor market conditions and amenities. This would require some more complex
general equilibrium modelling, which currently goes beyond what is numerically feasible.
Both, our treatment of the self-selection problem and the inference of microeconomic
structural parameters from macro data is an attempt to overcome the dichotomy of macro
and micro studies that has characterized the migration literature (see Greenwood, 1997).
8 Appendix
8.1 Existence and uniqueness of the value function
We begin with proving existence and uniqueness of the value function. Notation is as in
the maintext throughout this appendix, unless stated otherwise.




be the support of w.
Deﬁnition 2 Deﬁne a mapping T according to the migration problem of a household,
that is
T (u)(·)= m a x
j=A,B
©
exp(wjt) − I{i6=j}ct + βEtu(j,ct+1,w At+1,w Bt+1)
ª
. (24)
28The mapping T is deﬁned on the set of all real valued bounded functions B that are
continuous with respect to wA,B and c and have domain D = {A,B}×R+ × W2.
Lemma 3 The mapping T preserves boundedness.
Proof. To show that T preserves boundedness one has to show that for any bounded
function u also Tu is bounded. Consider u to be bounded from above by ¯ u and bounded





















exp(wjt) − I{i6=j}ct + βu
ª
≥ exp(W)+βu > −∞. (27)
Lemma 4 The mapping T preserves continuity.
Proof. Since Tu is the maximum of two continuous functions it is itself continuous.
Lemma 5 The mapping T satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions.
Proof. First we need to show that for any u1 (·) <u 2 (·) the mapping T preserves the
inequality. Since both the expectations operator and the max preserve the inequality, also
T does. Secondly we need to show that T (u + a) ≤ Tu+γa for any constant a and some
γ<1. Straightforward algebra shows that
T (u + a)=Tu+ βa. (28)
Since β<1 by assumption, T satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions.
Proposition 6 The mapping T has a unique ﬁxed point on B, and hence the Bellman-
equation has a unique solution.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from the last three Lemmata.
8.2 Invariant distribution
We prove that without aggregate shocks migration and idiosyncratic shocks to income
describe an ergodic Markov-process. Therefore there is an invariant distribution, this
process converges to.
29For simplicity we present the proof for an arbitrary discrete approximation of the
continuous income (state-space) model.
Lemma 7 Assume any (large and ﬁne enough but otherwise arbitrary) discretization
of the state space with n points for the potential income in the regions, each. Then
we can capture the transition from ft to ft+1, which are the unconditional density of
the distribution of households over both regions and (potential) income, in a matrix
B =
Ã
(I − DA)Π DBΠ
DAΠ (I − DB)Π
!
∈ R2n2×2n2
.15 In this matrix, Π denotes the transition
matrix that approximates the the AR(1)-process for income by a Markov-chain, see Adda
and Cooper (2004, pp. 56) for details. Matrix Di is the n2 × n2 diagonal matrix with
the hazard rate for each of the n2 income pairs of the income grid.
Proof. First, we take a discrete state space of n possible wages for each region, wA1...wBn
and wB1...wBn. Second, we denote in the following form the vector of probabilities that
describes the distribution of potential income and household locations
f =
³




Analogous, we deﬁne the distribution after migration but before idiosyncratic shocks, ˆ f.
Taking our law of motion from (16) we obtain as a discretized analog
ft+1 =( I2 ⊗ Π) ˆ ft. (30)
Here ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Now, given our vectorization of the wage grid,
deﬁne di as the fraction of households that migrate and are in the i−th wage and location
triple, i.e. di = Λj (wAk,w Bl),i=1 ...2n2, where (j,wAk,w Bl) being the i-th element in
the vectorized grid. Moreover, deﬁne D = diag (d) as the diagonal matrix with migration
rates on the diagonal and DA and DB as the diagonal matrices with only the ﬁrst n2
and the last n2 elements of d respectively. Then we can describe the transition from ft
to ˆ ft by
ˆ ft =
Ã
I − DA DB
DA I − DB
!
ft (31)
15Since we work with a discretization, correctly speaking f is not the density, but the vactor of
probabities of drawing a location-income possibility vector from a given element of the grid.
30Combining the last two equations, we obtain
ft+1 =
Ã
(I − DA)Π DBΠ
DAΠ (I − DB)Π
!
ft. (32)
Lemma 8 For any distribution of idiosyncratic shocks with support equal to W2, matrix
Π has only strictly positive entries.
Proof. If the idiosyncratic shocks have support equal to W2, then every pair of potential
income can be reached from every other pair as a result of the shock. Thus all entries of
Π are strictly positive.
Lemma 9 For any distribution of costs with support equal to R+, 0 ≤ di < 1 holds for
a l ld i a g o n a le l e m e n t sdi of D. If the grid is ﬁne enough also di > 0 holds for at least
one i.
Proof. If there is no upper bound for migration costs the migration probability is strictly
smaller, since V is bounded. This means 0 ≤ di < 1. Let Cmax =m a x (wA,wB)∈W2 |¯ c(wA,w B)|
be the largest possible gain from migration. If the grid for costs is ﬁne enough, there will
always be a migration costs grid-point smaller than Cmax, since migration costs can be
arbitrarily close to zero. Hence, there is some i such that di > 0 holds if the grid is ﬁne
enough.
Lemma 10 For any distribution of costs with support equal to R+, B2 has only positive
entries.
Proof. We obtain for B2
B2 = BB =
Ã
((I − DA)Π)
2 + DBΠDAΠ (I − DA)ΠDBΠ + DBΠ(I − DB)Π





Each entry of this matrix is weakly positive, since all three (I − Di),D i and Π are
positive. Hence we only need to argue that in each sum at least one part is always strictly
positive. For the elements on the diagonal this follows directly from (I − Di)Π > 0. For
the oﬀ-diagonal elements, we may have some rows of zeros in DiΠ. However, at least
one row of DiΠ will be non-zero, because there is some non-zero di and (I − Di)Π > 0,
so that all elements of (I − Di)ΠDjΠ are strictly positive.
Proposition 11 Under the assumptions of the above Lemmas, migration and idiosyn-
cratic shocks deﬁne an ergodic process with stationary distribution F0 =l i m n→∞ Bnei.
31Proof. The above Lemma directly implies the ergodicity of the Markov chain.
8.3 Data
Data on migration between US states are provided by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). The IRS uses individual income tax returns to derive internal migration between
US states. In particular, the IRS compiles migration data by matching the Social Secu-
rity number of the primary taxpayer from one year to the next. The IRS identiﬁes the
households with an address change from the previous year, and then totals migration
to and from each state in the U.S. to every other state. Given these bilateral migration
data we compute aggregate gross inmigration for the 51 US states (including District
of Columbia) as the sum of all inmigrations from other US states to a particular state.
Migration rates are calculated by expressing gross inmigration as proportions of the
number of non-migrants reported in the IRS dataset.
Income per capita data are from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The income per capita ﬁgure for the
alternative region is computed as the population-weighted mean of all per capita incomes
outside a speciﬁcs t a t e .
In the estimations, we remove a linear time trend from the data and express all vari-
ables as deviations from their unit-speciﬁc means, i.e. we apply a within-transformation.
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for the original as well as for the transformed data.
In order to examine the time-series properties of the employed data we performed a
brief unit root analysis for the migration rates, the income per capita, and the income
per capita in the complementary region. In a sample of this size (T =1 6 ,N =5 1 )
either a Breitung and Meyer (1994) or a Levin, Lin, and Chu (2003) unit root test
appears most appropriate. For the Breitung and Meyer (1994) test we determined the
optimal augmentation lag length by sequential t−testing. Taking into account three
augmentation lags and time-speciﬁce ﬀects we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. Similarily, the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2003) rejects
the null hypothesis of a unit root taking a linear time trend into account.
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